

RECRUITING (BABIL VOLUNTEER)
CENTER
AL HILLA, IRAQ

SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT

SIGIR PA-06-089
APRIL 17, 2007

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

April 17, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL
SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT: Report on Recruiting (Babil Volunteer) Center Sustainment, Al Hilla, Iraq
(Project Number SIGIR PA-06-089)

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is conducting a series of assessments to assess the current condition of completed projects subsequent to their transition to the Government of Iraq to determine whether the projects are likely to remain operational.

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses construction work performed on the Recruiting Center in Al Hilla, Iraq, to determine if the project is likely to remain operational after its transition to the Government of Iraq. This assessment was made to provide you and other interested parties with real-time information on relief and reconstruction projects in order to enable appropriate action to be taken, if warranted.

The coordinated comments received from the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq in response to a draft of this report addressed the recommendations, and the actions taken and planned should address the issues we identified. As a result, comments to this final report are not required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Brian Flynn at brian.flynn@sigir.mil or at 914-360-0607. For public or congressional queries concerning this report, please contact SIGIR Congressional and Public Affairs at publicaffairs@sigir.mil or at 703-428-1100.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SIGIR PA-06-089

April 17, 2007

Recruiting (Babil Volunteer) Center Sustainment Assessment Al Hilla, Iraq

Synopsis

Introduction. The Inspections Directorate of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is assessing transitioned projects to determine if they are likely to remain operational after transition from the United States Government to the Government of Iraq.

This report addresses our assessment of the Recruiting (Babil Volunteer) Center in Al Hilla, Iraq that was occupied by the Iraqi Armed Forces in June 2006. The Recruiting Center was constructed to screen and process up to two hundred volunteers per day to enlist in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Requirements for the number of recruits to be processed at the center are based on directives from the Iraqi Prime Minister when he calls for volunteers. The center processes volunteers by interviewing candidates, testing their reading and writing skills, and conducting physical exams. Approved candidates are given orders to report to designated Iraqi Armed Forces units for basic training. The Recruiting Center staff includes the commander, watch captains, and soldiers, who guard the facility and support recruit processing. The facility is capable of accommodating the staff and recruits. We conducted this project assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included a professional engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

Project Assessment Objectives. This report is made to provide project information to interested parties in order to enable timely and appropriate action, when warranted. Our assessment objectives were to determine whether the facility is operating at the designated capacity, if the construction quality was adequate, and if it remains in good operating repair. To address these objectives, we reviewed contract documentation, met with responsible project officials and visited the site on 20 January 2007. The Babil Volunteer Center was delivered by the contractor to the United States Government on 7 December 2005. On 13 June 2006 the United States Government transitioned the facility to the Iraqi Armed Forces. The facility has been occupied and used for its intended purpose to process recruits into the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Conclusions.

1. Based on our inspection we concluded that the facility is being used for its intended purpose to screen and process recruits into the Iraqi Armed Forces.
2. In general, the construction quality adequately meets the objectives of the recruiting center. However, the following deficiencies identified during our assessment could significantly shorten the useful life of the facility if left unresolved:
 - External water pumps were exposed to the elements and the wiring that powers the pumps was indoor rather than outdoor quality.
 - Bathrooms floors were buckled due to water leaks that appear to have been caused by sewage backup from an overflowing holding tank. The sewage holding tanks could not be readily evacuated because access by pumping trucks was restricted.

- The guard house roof had deteriorated and leaked.
3. Inadequate funding was causing inadequate facility maintenance. Bathrooms were not cleaned, electrical wiring had been “jerry rigged” and the sewage holding tank was never evacuated. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction believes that if the maintenance continues at its current level, the useful life of the bathroom plumbing, electrical wiring and sewage system will be significantly shortened.
 4. Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq could not provide sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the facility was officially transferred to the Government of Iraq.

Recommendations.

1. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence and the contractor have taken action to investigate the causes for the deficiencies that could be attributable to warranty issues. The contractor visited the site and repaired the leaking roof on the guard house as well as the main building.
2. The contractor agreed to repair the buckled flooring and pipe damaged by the occupants. It will also provide accessibility to the sewage holding tank and have the tank evacuated.
3. The water pumps should be protected from the outside elements and appropriate wiring should be installed. Additionally, the disconnected pump should be connected to a power source.
4. The Government of Iraq should be notified that the facility is not being maintained adequately and they should be encouraged to allocate funds from the Government of Iraq’s Base Support program to provide an appropriate operation and maintenance program for the center.
5. Because the United States Government is not responsible for operating the facility after it is completed, it is important to transfer the project as soon as possible to ensure warranty issues can be addressed by the new occupant. At a minimum, SIGIR believes that documentation for transferring property from the United States Government to the Government of Iraq should include the following and be retained in the project files:
 - a. An agreement between the United States Government and the Ministers of Finance and Defense that the Government of Iraq accepts the facility and has taken responsibility for operations. If either Ministry delays accepting the project, the United States Government should take unilateral action to transfer the project by sending a formal notice that the project has been completed and will be transferred to the Government of Iraq on a specific date.
 - b. A description of the warranty rights available to the new occupants along with points of contact for warranty repairs.
 - c. A copy of the final inspection report and “punch list”.
 - d. Operation and maintenance manuals along with notification to the occupant that failure to properly maintain the facility could void the warranty.
 - e. As-built drawings of the facilities and systems.
 - f. Spare parts needed to meet operation and maintenance requirements for the period of time required by the contract.

Management Comments. Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinated the management comments with the affected agencies. The following are replies to each recommendation:

Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq is reviewing the quality and placement of water pumps to determine the optimal type and location for servicing buildings in the region.

The contractor completed repairs to customer's satisfaction on 12 March 2007.

Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq is engaged in discussion with the Government of Iraq to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq participates in an interagency working group to establish appropriate and consistent asset transfer procedures, which will include clear definitions of responsibilities and rights associated with ownership. In the mean time, Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq has developed and successfully implemented its own transfer process in accordance with the anticipated features of the interagency process. Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq is also actively reviewing the documentation retained from older projects and regenerating transfer agreements as required.

Evaluation of Management Comments. We reviewed the management comments and after further clarification with Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq officials we found them to be responsive to our recommendations. The following are additional clarifications of selected comments:

Recommendation #1 Water Pumps: Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq officials noted that they intend to take appropriate action upon completing their review. Specific action would include notifying the responsible organization that the pumps need to be protected and connected to an appropriately wired power source.

Recommendation #4 Transfer Procedures: Multi-National Forces Security Transition Command-Iraq officials noted that they are transferring completed facilities in accordance with the current interagency draft procedures. They are preparing documentation packages for previously transferred assets, including the Hilla Recruiting Center, to make the transfer compliant with current procedures.

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Introduction

Objective of the Project Assessments

This project assessment is intended to provide project information to interested parties in order to enable timely and appropriate action, when warranted. Our assessment objectives were to determine whether the facility is operating at the designated capacity, if the construction quality was adequate, and if it remains in good operating repair.

Background

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was the funding agency responsible for defining the general requirements for the Recruiting Center and chose the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) as the procurement and management agency for the project. AFCEE awarded the prime contract to Weston Solutions, Inc. under Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contract FA8903-04-D-8681, Task Order (TO) 0187, dated August 4, 2005. The TO objective was to plan and construct two recruiting centers; one in Al Hilla and one in Mosul, Iraq. Our assessment scope focused on the Al Hilla Recruiting Center (URI# 21949).

The Statement of Work for the Al Hilla Recruiting Center included:

- site clearance, grading and landscaping
- constructing a new recruiting center building and a guard house
- constructing four guard towers
- constructing a perimeter wall and access gate with outside security lighting
- improving the access road and installing jersey barriers for traffic control
- constructing a parking lot for bus and passenger vehicles

The TO was modified four times:

- Modification #1 dated 15 December 2005 extended the completion date from 31 December 2005 to 1 April 2006 to accommodate a delay in completing the Mosul Recruiting Center.
- Modification #2 dated 6 March 2006 added the following scope changes:
 - Extend the external road to connect the main entrance to the existing road. Demolish the existing building to facilitate the new route.
 - Compact the sub-base between the main building and the perimeter wall and the area around the guard post, parking lots and guard towers.
 - Connect the water main and electricity to the municipal system
 - Construct two septic tanks¹.
 - Construct a walkway (1.2 meters wide).
 - Add ten jersey barriers.
 - Construct a shaded area.
 - Construct a concrete pad with a concrete roof slab and columns.
 - Add a stone layer to the facility yard.

¹ Our site visit disclosed the contractor actually installed a sewage holding tank because impervious clay will not allow water to seep into the soil.

- Supply and install two water storage tanks with electrical pumps.

The total TO cost remained the same, however, the period of performance was extended from 1 April 2006 to 30 June 2006 to accommodate the delay in completing the Mosul Recruiting Center.

- Modification #3 dated 15 May 2006 extended the period of performance from 30 June 2006 to 31 July 2006 to accommodate the delay in completing the Mosul Recruit Center. The Al Hilla Recruiting center was completed in November 2005 and delivered to the USG on 7 December 2005.
- Modification #4 dated 14 August 2006 reduced the contract cost by \$700,000 making the final cost for the two recruiting stations \$3,454,225. The fixed fee for the task order was \$332,338. In response to our inquiry AFCEE stated that the total cost for the Al Hilla Recruiting Center was \$1,823,731.

Weston Solutions subcontracted the Al Hilla Recruiting Center construction to an Iraqi Company on 11 August 2005. Subcontract price data provided by AFCEE, adjusted for scope reductions negotiated during the contract performance, is summarized below:

<u>Subcontract Cost Summary</u>			
	Initial Price	Adjustments	Final Price
Facility	\$440,380		\$440,380
Guard Towers	100,000	(25,000) ²	75,000
Guard Post Building	25,200		25,200
Entry Control Point	25,000		25,000
Renovate Building	65,000	(65,000) ³	0
Construct Interior Wall	15,600		15,600
Construct Exterior Wall	96,000		96,000
Construct Interior Road and Parking Lot	19,000		19,000
Install Interior Entry Gate	15,000		15,000
Construct Exterior Entry Way	60,000		60,000
Install T-Walls	60,000		60,000
Install Jersey Barriers	4,200		4,200
Total	\$925,380	(\$90,000)	\$835,380

The Transfer and Acceptance of Real Property (DD-1354) form dated 7 December 2005 transferred the facility from the contractor to the USG.

Documentation supporting the property transfer from the USG to the GoI is limited to a 13 June 2006, partially executed Letter for the Record (Subject: Transfer of Real Property) stating:

² [The subcontract](#) pricing information provided by AFCEE showed that the subcontract was reduced by \$25,000 because only three of four guard towers were required

³ [The subcontract](#) pricing information provided by AFCEE showed that no building renovation was required and the subcontract was reduced by the estimated cost of the renovation.

“On behalf of the Government of the United States, the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) takes great pleasure in presenting Real Property assets as identified on the attached documents to the GoI.

The letter was signed by the contractor however signature blocks for the Coalition Forces and the GoI were blank.

The center watch commander said the facility was occupied and commenced operations in June 2006.

Site Assessment

The SIGIR team consisting of a professional engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector visited the Al Hilla Recruiting Center on 20 January 2007. In general, construction workmanship and materials were adequate and the facility was operating as intended. We noted one instance where water pumps attached to outdoor tanks were unprotected, wired with indoor wiring, and one pump was not connected to a power source. However, we could not determine whether the pumps were the original installation or retrofitted after the IAF occupied the facility. We also found that restricted access to the sewage holding tank prevented the tanks from being evacuated. The tanks were overflowing and draining onto the adjacent lot. Backup from the tanks may have caused leakage to the main building drain pipes causing the bathroom floors to buckle and the floor tiles to be damaged. We also found damaged roof tiles that appear to have been caused by latent defects that may not have been evident at the final inspection. SIGIR believes that if the inferior materials and workmanship and the latent defects are still covered by the construction warranty they should be remedied by the contractor. If not remedied, the useful life of the guardhouse, bathrooms, and plumbing, electrical and sewage systems could be significantly shortened. We also found that maintenance of the facility was inadequate and if continued at the current level, the useful life of the facility could be significantly shortened.

1. U. S. Government Responsibility

AFCEE and MNSTC-I were responsible for insuring that design, workmanship and quality of materials met contract standards before transferring projects to the GoI. Imperfections are expected and should be identified through the quality assurance process including the final inspection which should produce a “punch list” of problems requiring correction by the contractor. Latent manufacturing defects discovered by the occupants after accepting the project should also be covered by warranties. AFCEE provided documentation that a final project inspection occurred and a “punch list” was prepared. Details of the deficiencies found during inspection are discussed below.

Two bathroom floors buckled causing damage to concrete and tiles. At AFCEE’s request, Weston’s subcontractor visited the site on 17 February 2007 to assess the damage to the floors. The contractor believes that the buckling resulted from water swelled soils surrounding the drain pipes due to wastewater leaking from damaged lines. The contractor noted that because the end user never evacuated the sewage holding tank, effluent backed-up in the drain lines and leaked into the ground beneath the floors. The contractor also stated that drain lines may have been damaged when the end user replaced a western style toilet.

SIGIR concurs that the buckling is likely caused by water leaking into the soil causing it to swell and exert upward pressure on the floors. We also agree that the likely cause for the leakage is failure to evacuate the sewage holding tanks which causes backup through the drain lines. The problem would be mitigated if the sewage holding tank were properly evacuated; however, force protection barriers and internal walls prevent pumping trucks from accessing the tanks. Site Photo 1 shows the buckled floors and tile damage. Site Photo 2 shows the overflowing sewage holding tanks draining raw sewage to the adjacent lot. Site Photo 3 shows the jersey barriers blocking the only vehicle access to the building rear.



Site Photo 1. Bathroom floor tile damage caused by buckling from ground swelling



Site Photo 2. Raw sewage draining from the holding tank to the adjacent property.




Site Photo 3. Jersey barriers blocking vehicle access to the building rear where the sewage holding tanks are located. (From Weston Photo Log)

After being notified of the problem, the contractor committed to provide an access route to the sewage holding tank and have it evacuated for the first time. The IAF will be responsible for subsequent evacuations. The contractor also agreed to repair the buckled floors and damaged drain pipes.

Our inspection noted that indoor electrical wiring, receptacles and junction boxes were used to power a water pump used in outdoor applications. The wiring appears to have shorted and ignited the electrical box, which has been replaced. A second water pump also used indoor electrical wiring but was not connected to a power source. The wiring, junction box, receptacle and pumps were left unprotected from the outside elements.

The contractor stated that the pumps were originally installed on the building roof but the current user moved them to the ground after occupying the facility. The contractor noted that all of the defects associated with the pumps' current condition are attributable to the end user relocating them from their original rooftop location. The contractor was unable to provide pictures or other evidence demonstrating the pumps were originally installed on the roof. Site Photos 4, 5, and 6 show the indoor wiring and electrical box, exposed water pumps, and disconnected wiring.



Site Photo 4. Indoor wiring and electrical box connecting to water pump



Site Photo 5. Water tank pump exposed to the outside elements



Site Photo 6. Exposed water pump connected to the main water supply line using indoor wiring. (Wiring is not connected to electrical power.)

The guard house roof deteriorated prematurely and the water tank on the roof apparently overflowed causing damage to the interior walls. After being notified of the problem, the contractor visited the site and repaired the roofs at the guard house and the main building. Site Photo 7 shows the deteriorated roof tiles and Site Photo 8 provided by the contractor on 17 February 2007 shows the repair work on the roof.




Site Photo 7. Deteriorated roof tiles on the guard house



**Site Photo 8. Contractor repairing the guard house roof after being notified by SIGIR
(From Weston photo log)**

2. Government of Iraq Responsibility (GoI)

Our inspection disclosed that bathrooms were not clean, there were no beds for the Iraqi soldiers stationed at the facility, and electrical wiring had been “jerry rigged” to either repair burned out circuits or to add lighting. Also, as previously mentioned, the waste water holding tank was full and channeling raw sewage onto the adjacent property which eventually drains into the Hilla River. If maintenance continues at its current level, SIGIR believes that the useful life of the facility will be significantly shortened. Also poor O&M practices such as “jerry-rigged” wiring and draining raw sewage into the Al Hilla River create fire and community health hazards. Site Photos 9 through 14 illustrate these conditions at the time of our assessment.



Site Photo 9. Example of an eastern style toilet that had not been maintained




Site Photo 10. Sewage holding tank filled to capacity and draining to the adjacent lot



Site Photo 11. Bedless sleeping quarters for the Iraqi soldiers assigned to the facility.



Site Photo 12. Post construction indoor wiring added to power the lighting for the outside staging area.



Site Photo 13 & 14: Guard house panel box cover missing and “jerry rigged” wiring to connect the air conditioning unit

In response to the inspection team’s inquiries, the duty watch commander noted that no operation or maintenance funds have been made available from the IAF to maintain the facility.

MNSTC-I informed us that they have been working with the GoI to develop a base support program that is using a three stage process to provide full scale maintenance at 83 military installations by January 2008. The first stage started in April 2006. It provides maintenance for four of the most critical utilities at the major bases: power plants, fuel, sewage, water distribution and food. The second phase started in January 2007 added four additional categories: water treatment, waste water treatment, plumbing, and interior electrical systems. The final phase, expected to start in June 2007, will add the remaining eleven additional categories to complete the full scale implementation. The GoI budgeted \$480 million for daily maintenance labor and supplies plus \$104 million for replacement parts and supplies to cover unforeseeable and emergency requirements. Maintenance is currently being done at the major bases with service contracts to local Iraqi

companies but as the program infrastructure develops, Iraqi civil servants and soldiers will replace the contracted maintenance. Based on the watch commander's statements, no BSU funding has been made available to the Recruiting Center.

3. Turnover Process

Neither AFCEE nor MNSTC-I could provide satisfactory documentation to demonstrate the facility was officially transferred by the USG to the GoI. The contractor's daily site reports indicated the work was completed on 1 November 2005 and a Transfer and Acceptance of Military Real Property (DD-1354) form, signed only by the contractor, was dated 7 December 2005. Based on comments from the watch commander, the IAF began occupying the site in June 2006.

SIGIR believes that satisfactory documentation for transferring property from the USG to the GoI should include:

- An agreement between the USG and the MoF and MoD that the GoI accepts the facility and has taken responsibility for operations. If either Ministry delays accepting the project, the USG should take unilateral action to transfer the project. The transfer should be made by sending a formal notice that the project has been completed and accepted from the contractor by the USG and will be transferred to the GoI on a specific date.
- A description of the warranty rights available to the new occupants along with points of contact for warranty repairs.
- A copy of the final inspection report and "punch list".
- O&M manuals along with notification to the occupant that failure to properly maintain the facility could void the warranty.
- As-built drawings of the facilities and systems.
- Spare parts needed to meet O&M requirements for the period of time required by the contract.

Conclusions

1. Based on our inspection we concluded that the facility is being used for its intended purpose to screen and process recruits into the IAF.
2. In general, the construction quality was adequate to meet the objectives of the recruiting center. However some construction deficiencies identified during our assessment could significantly shorten the useful life of some electrical systems, plumbing and the bathrooms if left unresolved. The contractor has already repaired the guardhouse roof after it was notified of the deficiency and has committed to providing an access route to the sewage holding tank and evacuating it for the first time.
3. The GoI Base Support program has not funded facility maintenance which is inadequate. Bathrooms were not cleaned, electrical wiring was "jerry rigged", and the sewage holding tank had not been evacuated. SIGIR believes that if the maintenance continues at its current level, the useful life of the facility will be significantly shortened.
4. The Multi National Forces Security Transition Command Iraq could not provide sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the facility was officially transferred to the GoI.

Recommendations

1. Upon hearing about the deficiencies the subcontractor visited the site, made an assessment of the deficiencies and repaired the guard house roof as a warranty item.
2. The contractor has committed to providing an access route to the sewage holding tanks and evacuating them for the first time. The IAF will be responsible for subsequent evacuations. The contractor will also repair the buckled bathroom floors and repair drainage pipes damaged by the occupants.
3. It is uncertain who is responsible for the unprotected water pumps and inferior wiring. Action should be taken to insure that outdoor wiring is installed, the water pumps are protected from the elements and the disconnected pump is connected to a power source.
4. The GoI should be notified that the facility is not being maintained adequately and they should be encouraged to allocate funds from the Base Support program to provide appropriate operation and maintenance at the center.
5. Because the USG does not have the responsibility to operate the facility after it is completed, it is important to transfer the project as soon as possible to ensure warranty issues can be addressed by the new occupant. At a minimum, SIGIR believes that documentation for transferring property from the USG to the GoI should include the following and be retained in the project files:
 - An agreement between the USG and the MoF and MoD that the GoI accepts the facility and has taken responsibility for operations. If either Ministry delays accepting the project, the USG should take unilateral action to transfer the project. The transfer should be made by sending a formal notice that the project has been completed and accepted from the contractor by the USG and transferred to the GoI on a specific date.
 - A description of the warranty rights available to the new occupants along with points of contact for warranty repairs.
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 - As-built drawings of the facilities and systems.
 - Spare parts needed to meet O&M requirements for the period of time required by the contract.

Management Comments

MNSTC-I coordinated the management comments with the affected agencies. Following are replies to each recommendation:

MNSTC-I is reviewing the quality and placement of water pumps to determine the optimal type and location for servicing buildings in the region.

The contractor completed repairs to customer’s satisfaction on 12 March 2007.

MNSTC-I is engaged in discussion with the Government of Iraq to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

MNSTC-I participates in an interagency working group to establish appropriate and consistent asset transfer procedures, which will include clear definitions of responsibilities and rights associated with ownership. In the mean time, MNSTC-I has developed and successfully implemented its own transfer process in accordance with the anticipated features of the interagency process. MNSTC-I is also actively reviewing the documentation retained from older projects and regenerating transfer agreements as required.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We reviewed the management comments and after further clarification with MNSTC-I officials we found them to be responsive to our recommendations. Following are additional clarifications of selected comments:

Recommendation #1 Water Pumps: MNSTC-I officials noted that they intend to take appropriate action upon completing their review. Specific action would include notifying the responsible organization that the pumps need to be protected and connected to an appropriately wired power source.

Recommendation #4 Transfer Procedures: MNSTC-I officials noted that they are transferring completed facilities in accordance with the current interagency draft procedures. They are preparing documentation packages for previously transferred assets, including the Hilla Recruiting Center, to make the transfer compliant with current procedures.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

SIGIR performed this project sustainment inspection in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included a professional engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

In performing this Project Sustainment Inspection we:

- Reviewed contract documentation to include the Contract, Contract Modifications, Contract documentation, and Statement of Work;
- Reviewed available turnover documents;
- Interviewed representatives from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE), the Duty Watch Commander at the Al Hilla Recruiting Center, and Weston, Inc.; and
- Conducted an on-site inspection at the Al Hilla Recruiting Center on 20 January 2007.

Appendix B. Acronyms

AFCEE	Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence
GoI	Government of Iraq
IA	Iraqi Army
IAF	Iraqi Armed Forces
IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
MNSTC-I	Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MoD	Iraqi Ministry of Defense
MoF	Minister of Finance
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PCO	Project and Contracting Office
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW	Statement of Work
TO	Task Order
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USG	United States Government

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Department of State

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

Inspector General, Department of State

Department of Defense

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Inspector General, Department of Defense

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,

Logistics, and Technology

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division

Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Other Federal Government Organizations

Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Defense
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
 Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism
 Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
 Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security
 Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Defense
 Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
 Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
 Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability
 Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
House Committee on International Relations
 Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia

Appendix D. Project Assessment Team Members

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

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